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PATENTLY PROTECTIONIST? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
PATENT CASES AT THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION
COLLEEN V. CHIEN*
ABSTRACT
The International Trade Commission (ITC) provides a special
forum for adjudicating patent disputes involving imports. It offers
several advantages over United States district courts to patentees,
including relaxed jurisdictional requirements, speed, and unique
remedies. Unlike district courts, the ITC almost automatically grants
injunctive relief to prevailing patentees, and does not recognize
certain defenses to infringement. These features have been justified
as needed to prosecute foreign infringers who would otherwise evade
U.S. district courts. They have also led to charges that the ITC is
protectionist and unfair to defendants and that it fosters inconsis-
tency in U.S. patent law.
Based on an analysis of every patent investigation initiated at the
ITC from 1995 to mid-2007, this Article assesses these charges. ITC
cases involve domestic defendants as often as they do foreign
defendants, and 72 percent of the time in combination. Thus, U.S.
companies are just as likely to be named in ITC actions as defen-
dants as are foreigners. When cases were adjudicated, plaintiffs at
the ITC were more likely to win than plaintiffs in district court (58
percent vs. 35 percent). However, when cases filed in both venues
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150962
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were compared, most of this difference disappeared (54 percent vs. 50
percent), cutting against claims of an anti-defendant bias. The data,
however, provide some support for the third contention. The ITC
takes about half as much time to decide cases, is four times more
likely to adjudicate its cases (44 percent vs. 11 percent), and more
readily awards injunctions to prevailing patentees (100 percent vs.
79 percent) than district court. The ITC cannot award damages
though, and its decisions do not bind district courts. The relief
provided is thus neither complete nor final. This creates incentives
for litigants to file in both venues, which is done at least 65 percent
of the time and creates the possibility of duplicative litigation and
inconsistent results.
As the number of ITC-eligible cases expands with the growth in
overseas manufacturing, the interface between the venues should be
revisited. This Article suggests several ways to strengthen coordina-
tion between the ITC and district courts to take into account the
increase in parallel litigation and concurrent risk of judicial
inefficiency. These include (1) limiting patent jurisdiction at the ITC
to cases that otherwise could not be heard in a U.S. district court;
and (2) reducing the incentive for cases to be filed in both venues by
harmonizing their rules and remedies.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150962
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1. BENJAMIN W. LABAREE, THE BOSTON TEA PARTY 264 (1964).
2. Id.
3. Although disfavored, neither subsidies nor tariffs have fallen into disuse. See, e.g.,
World Trade Organization, Chronological list of dispute cases, http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (listing, for example,
dispute cases DS265, DS266, and DS283 brought against European Communities subsidies
on sugar, case DS309 brought against Chinese value-added taxes on integrated circuits, and
cases DS255 and DS261 brought against Uruguayan and Peruvian taxes).
4. See id. (listing, for example, dispute cases DS 362 and DS 263, brought by the United
States against China to protect the American entertainment industry).
5. Republican Presidential Debate, Oct. 12, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2007/10/09/us/politics/09debate-transcript.html?pagewanted=all.
6. For example, through its promotion of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which obligates member countries of the World Trade
Organization to offer significant levels of intellectual property protection. See Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPS]; Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1225 (Apr. 15,
1994); see also 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2004) (“The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States regarding trade-related intellectual property are ... to further promote
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, including through ... ensuring
that the provisions of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual
INTRODUCTION
The United States has long distrusted its foreign trading
partners. In the 1770s, early Americans organized a boycott of cheap
goods from China, then seized and dumped cratefuls of underpriced
imports from India awaiting entry into the port of Boston.1 The
imports were tea, and this event, the Boston Tea Party, protected
the local tea market and spurred the revolution that led to the
founding of the United States.2 
The United States and other countries have historically used a
variety of means, in addition to border seizures, to regulate inter-
national trade. With the growth in free trade, traditional protection-
ist measures such as subsidies and tariffs have fallen into disfavor.3
Intellectual property law, in contrast, has recently gained popularity
as a form of trade regulation.4 There is a sense that, as one politi-
cian put it, “if we don’t get real careful and protect patents and
designs and technology[,] [American] intellectual property[] is going
to get stolen by the Chinese or by others.”5 It is perhaps no surprise
then, that the United States has pushed for stronger intellectual
property protections abroad.6 
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property rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection
similar to that found in United States law ....”).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000).
8. § 1337(a)(1)(A)-(B).
9. § 1337(b).
10. § 1337(d).
11. § 1337(c)-(i).
12. § 1337(b)(1).
13. See, e.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Imports of Certain Automotive Spring
Assemblies, ¶¶ 19-20, L/5333 (May 26, 1983), GATT B.I.S.D. at 305/107 (1984) [hereinafter
Canada Panel Report]; Report of the Panel, United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, ¶ 4.2, L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. at 365/345 (1990) [hereinafter EC Panel
Report]. One of these reports found a violation, leading to subsequent changes to the law. See
infra Part II.
14. See, e.g., TRIPS art. 1, pt. 1 (“Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this
One of the oldest intellectual property measures to reflect this
pro-protection sentiment is section 337 of the 1930 Trade Act.7
Section 337 prohibits unfair competition, often in the form of patent
infringement, from imported goods if the effect or threat of such
importation is to injure a U.S. industry.8 Pursuant to the statute, a
special venue, the International Trade Commission (ITC), offers
advantages unavailable in district courts to domestic industries
seeking to defend their rights against imports.9 Like the Boston Tea
Party, section 337 may be enforced at the border, barring infringing
products from entry into the United States.10
Although section 337 provides a favorable venue for targeting
imports, it fosters a two-track patent litigation system that treats
domestic and foreign goods differently. Foreign goods are poten-
tially subject to patent litigation in two venues (the ITC and U.S.
district courts), while domestic goods are subject to litigation in only
a single venue. Although both are subject to the review of the
Federal Circuit, the ITC applies different legal standards and offers
different remedies than U.S. district courts.11 Section 337 outcomes
are decided on an accelerated schedule, but do not bind district
courts that may be obligated to relitigate the same issues.12 
While these features are perceived to protect domestic industries,
they raise international and domestic concerns. Two international
trade disputes have alleged that section 337 discriminates against
foreign products and violates national treatment:13 the principle
that requires foreign citizens to be treated as well as domestic
citizens under national law.14 Although section 337 has since been
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Agreement to the nationals of other Members.”).
15. See, e.g., Hearing on Process Patents Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong.
(2007) [hereinafter Hearing Testimony] (testimony of Chris Cotropia, Professor of Law,
University of Richmond), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?
id=2735 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008) (noting “the possibility of inconsistent treatment of like
cases [in the ITC versus district court] presents international concerns”); Id. (testimony of
John Thomas, Professor of Law, Georgetown University) (noting that “[a]lthough the analysis
of whether the current situation constitutes a violation of the TRIPS Agreement is complex,
the perceived favoritism for U.S. industry over foreign firms may send a conflicting message
as the United States proceeds against [its] trading partners for perceived lapses in their
intellectual property regimes”) (internal citations omitted); John M. Eden, Unnecessary
Indeterminacy: Process Patent Protection After Kinik v. ITC, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9,
¶ 27 (alleging that the ITC’s failure to recognize a statutory defense to patent infringement
“appears to be inconsistent with the language and purpose of Article 34 of TRIPS”); Ann Elise
Herold Li, Is the Federal Circuit Affecting U.S. Treaties? The ITC, § 271(g), GATT/TRIPS and
the Kinik Decision, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 601, 604 (2006) (discussing
“the potential areas where the U.S. is no longer in compliance with the TRIPS agreement”);
Daniel Pruzin, Canada, Japan Join EU in Claiming US Tariff Law Violates Global Trade
Rules, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. 236 (2000).
16. See Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement Cases: A
Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 457, 490 (2008)
(“The ITC’s propensity to find infringement in patent cases ... indicates a bias in the ITC’s
decision making.”). 
17. See, e.g., EC Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 3.29 (noting that the “short time-limits
under Section 337 put respondents in a worse position, relative to complainants”).
18. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES - BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(BOP) BASIS (2008), available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/
gands.pdf (reporting an increase in imports from $956 billion in 1996 to $2,204 billion in
2006).
19. From eleven section 337 investigations in 1996 to thirty section 337 investigations in
2006 (author’s independent research).
20. See Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the ITC,
Duke Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 181, at 3 (Jan.
amended, suspicion still lingers among scholars and governments
that the ITC is protectionist and may violate international law.15
Due to its favorable procedural and substantive rules, the ITC is
also perceived to be biased in favor of plaintiffs,16 referred to in the
ITC as “complainants.” For example, critics have raised due process
concerns about the venue’s speed, lack of counterclaims, and other
procedures.17
With the growth in imports,18 the use of section 337 has tripled
over the past ten years.19 Some warn, however, that this expansion
will only exacerbate an emerging “incoherency” in patent law, due
to the differences in substantive patent law applied by the ITC and
the district courts.20 In May 2007, Congress held hearings on the
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2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1082894. 
21. Hearing Testimony, supra note 15 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (stating with
regard to the unavailability of “271(g) defenses” in the ITC as compared to their availability
in district court: “[t]he issue we consider today is whether this distinction should remain”).
22. See, e.g., The Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 10 (2007), and later
versions of the bill, which would limit venue for patent suits to the district (1) where either
party resides; or (2) where the defendant committed the infringing acts and had an
established place of business. Id.
23. See, e.g., Eden, supra note 15, ¶ 7.
24. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Representative Henry Waxman (D-Cal.), et al. to U.S. Trade
Representative Susan Schwab (Mar. 12, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
documents/20070312150354-57219.pdf (discussing, critically, U.S. free trade agreement
provisions that would enhance intellectual property and data protection laws).
25. See, e.g., Carsten Fink & Carlos Primo Braga, How Stronger Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights Affects International Trade Flows 2 (World Bank Policy Research Working
Paper No. 2051, 1999) (estimating a gravity model for high technology trade); Guifang Yang
& Keith Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights, Licensing, and Innovation 2 (World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 2973, 2003) (developing a theoretical model in which developed
nations innovate products and decide whether to transfer production rights through licensing
to developing nations). 
26. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099 (2000); Jay Kesan & Gwendolyn G.
Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and
Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237 (2006); Kimberly Moore, Empirical
subject of whether the defenses available in the ITC and district
court should be harmonized.21 Indeed, the ITC’s different rules and
remedies invite selective filing even as Congress has moved to
discourage forum shopping among district courts.22
These developments call for a review of section 337. Although its
proponents claim that the ITC is necessary to fill a gap left by the
district courts, its detractors claim that the venue fosters protection-
ism, an anti-defendant bias, and inconsistency and incoherency in
U.S. patent law.23 This Article seeks to address these claims by
empirically analyzing every section 337 patent case initiated
between January 1995 and June 2007. 
This study is relevant to other policy debates as well. First, while
intellectual property occupies a prominent position on the trade
agenda,24 much of what is known about the impact of strengthened
intellectual property rules on trade is anecdotal or hypothesized.25
Descriptive empirical work in this area could inform how to best
further national innovation objectives while taking into account
the impact of globalization on intellectual property. Second, while
the patent system has come under increasing empirical scrutiny,26
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Statistics on Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 227 (2004); Kimberly Moore,
Judges, Juries & Patent Cases: An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365
(2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box]; Kimberlee G. Weatherall & Paul H. Jensen, An
Empirical Investigation into Patent Enforcement in Australian Courts, 33 FED. L. REV. 239
(2005).
27. See H. Res. 34, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted) (“To establish a pilot program in certain
United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among
district judges.”). 
28. Author’s independent analysis; accord Christine McDaniel & Deepak Somaya,
Differences Between District Court and ITC Patent Enforcement In The United States 19
tbl.3-4 (2006) (on file with the author) (statistics based on an analysis of cases from 1975-
2000). In contrast, patent cases comprise around 1 percent of district court dockets, based on
patent and other district court suits from 1995-2005, see Jeffrey Johnson et al., Patent Suits
and Other Civil Actions, Over Time, available at http://www.patstats.org/Historical_
Filings_PatentSuits_OtherSuits.doc (last visited Sept. 22, 2008), and about 33 percent of the
docket at the Federal Circuit. See UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, ADJUDICATIONS BY MERIT PANELS, BY CATEGORY, FY 2006, available at http://www.
cafc.uscourts.gov/pdf/ChartAdjudications06.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2008).
29. See infra Part III.
30. Reported infra Part III, tbl.8. The difference was not statistically significant. See infra
notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
little attention has been paid to section 337. Finally, there has been
legislative interest in creating a specialized patent court at the
district court level.27 The ITC, 85 percent of whose docket consists
of patent cases,28 may provide a useful case study for legislative
policymaking.
As reported below, the data suggest that jurisdictional distinc-
tions between the ITC and district courts have blurred. Although
created to deal with the special problem of “unfair trade,” the ITC
has gone “mainstream”: 65 percent of the ITC cases studied had a
district court counterpart, which indicates that the ITC is often not
the venue of only resort as it was originally conceived to be.29 In
addition, section 337 is used just as often against domestic defen-
dants as it is against foreign defendants. This indicates that the ITC
is evolving away from its protectionist roots.
Differences between the two venues persist in terms of outcomes,
however. While there was little evidence that plaintiffs fared better
in the ITC than in district courts—ITC plaintiffs won 54 percent of
adjudicated cases versus a 50 percent win rate for district court
plaintiffs in parallel cases30—plaintiffs had better odds of getting
injunctive relief from the ITC than from district court (100 percent
ITC injunction rate versus a 79 percent district court injunction
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31. Rate in district court upon a finding of infringement and request for injunction.
Reported infra at Table 9.
32. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(A) (2007). 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(B) et seq., added in 1988,
specifies that importation of articles that infringe U.S. intellectual property relating to a U.S.
industry are also entitled to relief. See also Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. 100-418, § 1342(a)(1).
rate).31 ITC plaintiffs also had no chance of being awarded damages,
which are only available in district court. Thus, while this study
found no evidence of a bias against defendants (also called “respon-
dents”) or against foreigners in the ITC, it confirmed differences
between the venues in terms of the remedies applied. 
Taken together, the data fail to support two major criticisms that
have been levied against the ITC—that it is anti-defendant and that
it is anti-foreigner. However, the data also portray a venue that
has outgrown its original purpose: the ITC is no longer reserved for
the specific threat of foreign piracy. In addition, while the ITC’s
jurisdiction increasingly overlaps with that of district courts, its law
and remedies remain distinct. The absence of coordination between
the venues combined with the high rate of parallel litigation cause
this two-track system to invite judicial waste and expose parties to
the risk of duplicative litigation and potentially conflicting out-
comes.
The following sections consider these issues in depth. Part I
provides a short history of section 337 and reviews the historical
origins of the ITC. Part II describes the methods by which I ob-
tained data to evaluate the ITC. Part III provides the results of the
analysis and comments on their significance. Part IV considers ways
in which the interface between the ITC and district courts could be
changed, including (1) limiting patent jurisdiction at the ITC to
cases that otherwise could not be heard in district courts, and (2)
reducing the incentive for cases to be filed in both venues by
harmonizing their rules and remedies.
I. BACKGROUND
Section 337 provides relief from unfair methods of competition
and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States,
or in their sale, if the effect or tendency of such actions is to destroy
or substantially injure a U.S. industry.32 This formulation reflects
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33. Tariff Act of 1922 § 316(a), Pub. L. No. 67-318, 42 Stat. 858 (1922).
34. Id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. 31 REPS. OF THE U.S. TARIFF COMMISSION, Rep. 3 (Dec. 1930); JUDITH GOLDSTEIN,
IDEAS, INTERESTS, AND AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 206 (1994).
38. Although the statute contemplates the application of section 337 to a potentially wide
range of unfair competition, other applications have largely been delegated to other statutes.
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes “global safeguard” investigations to determine
whether the importation of an article is likely to be a substantial cause of serious injury or
threat of serious injury to a domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive product.
See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Trade Remedy Investigations, Understanding Safeguard
Investigations, Section 201, http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/ trao/us201.htm) (last visited
Sept. 22, 2008). In addition, specific relief in the form of duty orders can be sought when a
foreign producer prices goods below their fair value, thus engaging in “dumping,” or benefits
from government subsidies. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1994).
39. Robert A. Caplen, Recent Trends Underscoring International Trade Commission
Review of Initial Determinations and Federal Circuit Appeals from Final Commission
Determinations Under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 337, 341 (2007).
40. Douglas A. Irwin, Changes in U.S. Tariffs: The Role of Import Prices and Commercial
Policies, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1015, 1016 (1998).
41. See Barry Eichengreen, The Political Economy of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (NBER
several decades of U.S. trade policy and the inherent tension
between protecting American industries and minimizing interfer-
ence with legitimate trade. 
The statute was first enacted as section 316 of the Tariff Act of
1922.33 This provision made it unlawful to engage in “unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States, or their sale by the owner, importer,
or consignee ....”34 To ensure that the legislation would further
domestic interests, the statute applied only to actions that threat-
ened to injure a domestic industry that existed or was being
established.35 The law authorized the President to levy duties on or
exclude the imports from the market,36 a power that was used to
keep imported revolvers, manila rope, and resin out of the U.S.
market.37 Through these early cases, patent infringement was
established as an “unfair act,” paving the way for the majority of
section 337 cases to follow.38
In 1930, section 337 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act superseded
section 316.39 The Act raised tariffs on a wide array of goods40 and
led to a series of retaliatory trade measures that have been credited
with spurring, deepening, and lengthening the Great Depression.41
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Working Paper No. W2001, 1986).
42. 133 CONG. REC. H2548 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1987) (statement of Rep. Carlos Moorhead).
43. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See Robert G. Krupka et al., Section 337 and the GATT: The Problem or the Solution?,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 779, 787 (1993).
49. See id. at 787-88.
50. See id. at 789.
51. Canada Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 27.
52. Id. ¶ 28.
While section 337 largely retained the language of section 316,
complainants brought few cases under this version of the statute,
due in part to the lack of formal procedures for obtaining relief.42
This changed with the 1974 Trade Act,43 under which the statute
began to take its modern form. 
The 1974 Trade Act empowered the newly-renamed International
Trade Commission with final decision-making authority, subject
only to presidential veto for policy reasons.44 It formalized section
337 adjudications by subjecting them to the requirements of the
Administrative Procedures Act45 and gave the ITC the power to
issue cease and desist orders in addition to exclusion orders.46 Most
importantly, the Act codified the venue’s most attractive feature—
its speed—by requiring the ITC to decide cases in twelve months, or
in complex cases, eighteen months.47 This characteristic most clearly
distinguished the ITC from the district courts, which had no set
time limits. 
With these changes, the number of section 337 cases (also called
“investigations”) rose.48 Most of these involved patents and the
special problems presented by curbing infringing imports.49 The
Commission’s jurisdiction was nationwide and in rem, based on
the contested goods themselves, rather than in personam.50 This
afforded patentees several advantages. First, it made it easier to
bring cases against foreign defendants who might otherwise evade
service.51 In rem remedies were also more effective against foreign
defendants with few assets in the United States against which
damage awards could be enforced.52 Finally, this jurisdiction pro-
vided the basis for general exclusion orders, which could be used to
74 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:063
53. See Krupka, supra note 48, at 802.
54. See id.
55. In re Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps & Components Thereof, USITC Pub. 1199,
Inv. No. 337-TA-90, 216 U.S.P.Q. 465, 473 (Nov. 1981).
56. See id. 
57. 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 897 (1990).
58. See In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litig., 721 F. Supp. 596, 598 (D. Del.
1989), aff’d, Diversified Prods. Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 824 F.2d 980 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
59. See Convertible Rowing, 721 F. Supp. at 598.
60. See id. at 604.
61. See id. at 602.
block the importation of infringing articles regardless of source.53
Such orders, available exclusively in the ITC, extended beyond
parties to the litigation and provided patentees with a powerful
weapon against both actual and potential infringers.54 As the
Commission stated in In re Certain Airless Paint Spray Pumps, gen-
eral exclusion orders saved patentees the need to “file a series of
separate complaints against several individual foreign manufactur-
ers as it becomes aware of their products in the U.S. market. Such
a practice would not only waste the resources of the complainant, it
would also burden the Commission with redundant investiga-
tions.”55 To get such an order, a complainant had to show a wide-
spread pattern of unauthorized use of the patented invention and
demonstrate difficulties in identifying potential sources of infringe-
ment.56
The increased use of section 337, however, highlighted a new
problem: the overlapping jurisdiction between the ITC and district
courts on intellectual property matters. In In re Convertible Rowing
Exerciser Patent Litigation,57 the plaintiff asserted a patent in
district court that had already been invalidated by the ITC, a
finding affirmed by the Federal Circuit.58 The district court had to
decide whether these previous decisions were binding.59 Despite
the benefits of preclusion, including judicial efficiency, fairness,
and consistency with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the court
nevertheless decided against it.60 The district court reviewed the
legislative history of the 1974 Amendments, which emphasized the
separate origins of ITC and district court patent jurisdiction.61 It
found that according to the congressional record, the ITC had no
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62. See id.
63. Id. at 601.
64. See id. at 602.
65. See id.
66. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 851 F.2d 342, 344 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
accord Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 80 F.3d 1553, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting
Young Eng’rs, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
67. Pub. L. 100-418; 134 CONG. REC. 17,942 (1988).
68. International Piracy Involving Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade, Productivity, and Economic Growth of the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Cong. 1028
(1986) (opening statement of Sen. Pete Wilson). 
69. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107
(1988).
jurisdiction to decide issues of patent validity and infringement,
except to the extent required to decide whether there was a section
337 violation.62 The district court concluded that, because “jurisdic-
tion over unfair trade acts lies with the ITC while jurisdiction over
the validity, enforceability and infringement of patents lies with the
federal District Courts,”63 ITC decisions should not preclude review
by later district courts.64 The court cited differences in the forms and
procedures of the two venues.65 Since then, the Federal Circuit has
consistently held that “the ITC’s determinations regarding patent
issues should be given no res judicata or collateral estoppel effect
....”66 
Despite the increased use of section 337 after the 1974 amend-
ments, the ITC was still found to be “cumbersome and costly  ...
[failing to] provide[] United States owners of intellectual property
rights with adequate protection against foreign companies violating
such rights.”67 Congressional hearings on the subject were infused
with imagery of thieves on the foreign seas, with Senator Pete
Wilson (R-Cal.) drawing a parallel between “the pirates of old [who]
had to carry off their heavy booty, heavy enough to require several
strong men to carry it” and modern day pirates, who could take an
item, “reproduce it without authorization, without license, and ...
perhaps sell even more pirated copies than the original ....”68 
The resulting Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
substantially eased the requirements for bringing a section 337
case.69 The Act eliminated the requirement of proof of injury to a
domestic industry, in effect creating a per se rule that a finding
of intellectual property infringement provided sufficient proof of
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70. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, at 156 (1987) (describing a “public interest in the enforcement
of protected intellectual property rights .... [T]he Committee believes that requiring proof of
injury, beyond that shown by proof of the infringement of a valid intellectual property right,
should not be necessary”).
71. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, supra note 69.
72. 134 CONG. REC. H2278, at 2298 (Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Representative Bob
Kastenmeier).
73. 134 CONG. REC. 17,943 (July 13, 1988). Another revision to the statute made things
worse for infringers. The civil penalty for violating a cease and desist order was increased
from $10,000 to $100,000 per day of violation, or twice the domestic value of the articles,
whichever was greater. Id.
74. Canada Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 14; EC Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 3.11.
75. EC Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 3.11.
76. Canada Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 19; EC Panel Report supra note 13, ¶ 3.12.
77. Canada Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 19.
78. Id.
79. EC Panel Report, supra note 13, ¶ 4.2.
80. Id. ¶ 5.20.
injury.70 It also relaxed the showing needed to satisfy the domestic
industry element.71 Proof was no longer needed that the industry
was efficiently and economically operated,72 or that the complainant
even manufactured competing goods domestically; engineering,
research, and mere licensing activities were sufficient.73 
These and other unique features of the ITC led to the initiation
of two cases at the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Council,
each asserting that section 337 was in conflict with national
treatment.74 These complaints focused on the ways in which
section 337 defendants, assumed to be foreign companies, were
disadvantaged by ITC proceedings.75 The strict time limits of ITC
investigations, it was argued, prevented defendants from a fair
opportunity to perform discovery and build their defenses.76 Section
337 also did not allow defendants to assert counterclaims, as
permitted in district courts.77 Furthermore, foreign manufacturers
could be subject to two proceedings at once—at the ITC and in a
district court—whereas domestic manufacturers could only be sued
in one venue.78 Also, the practice of granting general exclusion
orders that were effective against non-litigants was singled out as
discriminatory.79 
In 1988, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel
ruled that aspects of section 337 violated international law.80 It
found that the differences between ITC and district court proceed-
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81. Id.
82. Id. ¶ 5.22.
83. Id. ¶ 5.32.
84. Id. ¶¶ 5.32, 5.33.
85. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 321, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1659 (1995)).
86. Id. § 321(a)(2)(B).
87. Id.
88. Id. (codified at 19 C.F.R. § 210.23 (1994)).
89. Id. § 321(a)(5).
90. 138 CONG. REC. S12356 (Aug. 5, 1992) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller, IV)
(cited in DONALD KNOX DUVALL ET AL., UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE ITC: ACTIONS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 §
11:11 n.5 (2006)).
ings provided an advantage to domestically-made goods, specifically
citing problems raised by the possibility of parallel proceedings
against foreign manufacturers, fixed time limits, and the inability
of defendants to raise counterclaims.81 However, the panel found
certain aspects of section 337 reasonably necessary for securing
compliance with U.S. law.82 These included the in rem nature of
exclusion orders and the automatic enforcement of such orders at
the border.83 These were justified based on the potential difficulty
of collecting damages against foreigners.84 
As a result of the Panel Report, Congress changed section 337 to
its current form. The statutory time limits of twelve or eighteen
months were amended to “the earliest practical time.”85 Defendants
in the ITC could file counterclaims, but in order to minimize delay
with the ITC investigation, these claims would be automatically
removed to and adjudicated in a U.S. district court.86 The new law
empowered ITC respondents to request and obtain a stay of a
concurrent district court action,87 although the ITC lost its right to
suspend its own investigation in this situation.88 The amendments
also strengthened the requirements for general exclusion orders.89
Passed in accordance with the Uruguay Round Agreements, these
changes, enacted in 1995, embodied a minimalist approach to
reforming section 337. While they sought to bring the statute into
compliance with international law, the ITC’s overall purpose
remained, in the words of Senator John D. Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.),
“[to] help ensure that foreign companies cannot steal U.S. technol-
ogy and then use that stolen property to compete against the
rightful owners.”90 How the ITC did this was also to remain
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91. 139 CONG. REC. S576, 578 (Jan. 5, 1993) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller, IV)
(cited in DUVALL ET AL., supra note 90, § 11:11 n.6).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
93. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
94. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1).
95. See, e.g., In the Matter of Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, No. 337-
TA-543, 2007 ITC LEXIS 621, at *102 n.230 (ITC June 19, 2007) (“As for the argument that
the Commission is required to follow precedent on injunctions established in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) .... The Commission, in interpreting its organic
statute, takes the position that the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, represents a legislative
modification of the traditional test in equity ... [thus] it is unnecessary to show irreparable
harm to the patentee in the case of infringement by importation .... The difference between
exclusion orders granted under the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and injunctions granted
under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 283, is reasonable in light of the long-standing principle
that importation is treated differently than domestic activity.”).
96. Id. (emphasis added).
substantially the same. Despite the removal of time limits, Senator
Rockefeller contended that the amendments “should not, and indeed
will not, result in the determinations of the U.S. International
Trade Commission taking any longer than they have in the past.”91
In recent years, the interface between the ITC and district courts
has continued to evolve. Substantive differences between the two
venues have become more heightened, particularly with respect to
the standard for granting injunctive relief. When patent rights are
violated, district courts “may grant injunctions” under 35 U.S.C. §
283.92 As the Supreme Court clarified in eBay v. MercExchange, a
permanent injunction should only be awarded under this statute if
a plaintiff can show (1) irreparable injury, (2) the inadequacy of
remedies at law, such as money damages, (3) that the balance of
hardships warrants an equitable remedy, and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.93
In contrast, the ITC’s standard for awarding injunctive relief
derives from a different statute.94 Thus, the ITC is not bound by
eBay.95 If section 337 has been violated, the ITC “shall direct the
[infringing] articles ... [to] be excluded from entry into the United
States.”96 “Exclusion orders” typically prohibit respondents from
importing or selling for importation into the United States covered
products. Although the statute enumerates several public interest
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97. The considerations are public health and welfare, competitive conditions, and the
presence of competing goods. See id.
98. See DUVALL ET AL., supra note 90, § 7.20 (listing three cases—ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-60,
ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-67, and ITC Inv. No. 337-TA-182/188—that have used these
considerations to date). 
99. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2007). 
100. Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In deciding
whether to include downstream products in an exclusion order, the Commission takes into
account the so-called EPROM factors, including “the value of the infringing articles compared
to the value of the downstream products in which they are incorporated.” In the matter of
Certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories, Components Thereof, Products
Containing Such Memories, and Processes for Making Such Memories (EPROMs), Inv. No.
337-TA-276, Comm. Op. at 125-26 (May 1989), aff’d sub. nom., Hyundai v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 899 F.2d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (reflecting the same concerns as the 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(g)(2) defense); see also Amgen v. ITC, 519 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that,
in contrast with the 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) defenses, the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) defenses should be
applicable in the ITC).
101. Kinik, 362 F.3d at 1362.
102. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2007). 
103. See id. A patentee also has the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, and
offering to sell the patented invention. Id.
considerations97 that can be used to deny an injunction relief, they
rarely are.98
In addition, the ITC does not recognize all of the defenses
available to defendants in district court. Although both section 337
and the patent code prohibit the importation of products made by
patented processes,99 only district courts consider goods that are
“materially changed by subsequent processes” or have become “a
trivial and nonessential component of another product” to be non-
infringing.100 These defenses are not available to ITC respondents.101
Despite this divergence in substantive standards, the overlap in
the jurisdiction of the ITC and district courts has grown over the
last few decades. The elimination of the injury requirement for IP
cases has placed most cases involving importation-based infringe-
ment within the domain of the ITC. The patent statute, in turn, has
come to encompass section 337’s importation-related harms. The
1988 Process Patent Amendment Act made importation of a product
made by a patented process the exclusive right of a patentee.102
Subsequently, Congress added the right to import a patented
product made by a patented process to the list of exclusive rights
held by patentees.103 Yet significant procedural differences remain.
For instance, ITC investigations uniquely name a Commission
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104. 19 C.F.R. § 210.3 (1994).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Nathan G. Knight, Jr., Section 337 and the GATT: A Necessary Protection or
an Unfair Trade Practice?, 18 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 64 (1988).
107. See, e.g., Hearing Testimony, supra note 15 (statements of Chris Cotropia and John
Thomas).
108. Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, abstract, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=950583.
109. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 20, at 7-8. 
110. Robert J. Thomas, Patent Infringement of Innovations by Foreign Competitors: The
Role of the U.S. International Trade Commission, 53 J. MARKETING 63, 65-75 (1989).
investigative attorney (or “staff attorney”) from the Office of Unfair
Import Investigations (OUII) to each ITC investigation as a party
to represent the public interest.104 The staff attorney participates in
discovery, motions, and trial, creating a different case dynamic than
that experienced in district court.105
Through this history, a justification and several criticisms of
section 337 have been repeatedly advanced. The justification is that
according to the conventional wisdom, section 337 is needed to reach
foreign infringement.106 Without the ITC, foreign pirates would be
able to steal American innovation with impunity. The ITC’s
protection of American industries, however, has also led to the
primary criticism of the ITC: that the venue is protectionist and
anti-foreigner. Although facially neutral—indeed, U.S. patent-
holders, regardless of whether they are U.S. companies or foreign-
ers, can initiate investigations—section 337 is perceived to perpetu-
ate de facto discrimination against foreign companies, potentially in
violation of TRIPS.107 Observers also charge, as does one empirical
study, that there is “a bias in the ITC’s decision making [in favor of
patentees].”108 Finally, academics have noted the potential for
inconsistent judgments at the ITC and district courts, due to the
lack of res judicata and the application of different substantive law
within the two venues.109 
The justification and criticisms of section 337 in its current form
can be tested empirically. To date, however, studies have failed to
do so comprehensively. For instance, Robert Thomas published an
article in 1989 describing the use of section 337.110 He found that
complainants were using the ITC selectively and were more likely
to prevail against imports from less developed countries than those
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111. Id. at 73-75. 
112. See John Mutti & Bernand Yeung, Section 337 and the Protection of Intellectual
Property in the United States: The Complainants and the Impact, 78 REV. ECON. STAT. 510
(1996).
113. Id. at 519.
114. Id.
115. Catherine Y. Co, How Valuable are the Patents Behind Section 337 Cases?, 27 WORLD
ECON. 525, 528 (2004).
116. Id. at 529-32.
117. Id. at 530-37.
118. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 473-80.
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from more developed countries.111 In a later study, John Mutti and
Bernard Yeung collected company-level data on publicly traded
firms that filed section 337 cases between 1977 and 1990.112 Their
paper reported that complaining firms are typically larger, produce
a more diverse range of products, and invest more in intangibles
than noncomplaining firms.113 A loss by a complaining firm at the
ITC was associated with a significant decrease in a firm’s profit
relative to its peers, as well as a decrease in R&D spending by losing
firms in R&D-intensive industries.114 
More recently, Catherine Co analyzed the characteristics of
patents involved in section 337 cases filed between 1995 and June
2000.115 She found that patents litigated in section 337 actions
tended to be young (50 percent were less than five years old) and
had more forward citations, claims, and related patents abroad
than did patents litigated in federal district courts.116 She concluded
that, based on this evidence, section 337 cases generally involved
valuable patents.117
In 2008, Robert Hahn and Hal Singer published an important
study of the ITC that considered whether the ITC is biased in favor
of patentees.118 Analyzing a dataset that included all investigations
initiated at the ITC from 1972 through 2006, their paper reported
a likely bias in favor of patent holders based on several measures,
including patentee win rate and reversal rate at the Federal
Circuit.119 Although reaching a different conclusion, Hahn and
Singer’s study contains valuable data for comparison. 
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120. Telephone interview with ITC staff attorney (July 2006) (on file with author).
121. See, e.g., Hahn & Singer, supra note 16; Krupka, supra note 48; McDaniel & Somaya,
supra note 28. 
122. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
123. During this period, relatively fewer non-patent investigations were initiated at the
ITC, although international piracy is perceived to be a major problem by copyright- and
trademark-protected industries. This is because Customs is authorized to seize copyright and
trademark infringing goods upon IP holder request without the need for adjudication prior
to seizure. 17 U.S.C. §§ 601-03 (2000) (governing copyright); 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (2000)
(governing trademark). These provisions are aimed at “piratical copies,” and no counterpart
enforcement measure exists in patent law. This differential treatment is in accord with TRIPS
Article 51, which requires member countries to adopt measures with respect to counterfeit
trademark or pirated copyrighted goods, but not other intellectual property infringements.
TRIPS art. 51. But see European Community Council Regulation 1383/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 196)
(permitting border detention of goods suspected of patent infringement upon “application for
action” and prior to court adjudication).
124. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 472 tbl.2 (2004). Fewer
cases involving chemistry and pharmaceutical/medical patents were litigated at the ITC as
compared to district courts (14 percent of the ITC cases studied versus 26 percent of the
district court cases described in Allison’s article), whereas mechanical technologies were
litigated in roughly equal proportion in the two venues (15 percent of ITC cases versus 16
percent of district court cases). Id. The remaining 11 percent of ITC cases and 26 percent of
district court cases fell into the category of “other.” Id.
II. METHODS
To perform my analysis, I collected data relating to all patent
investigations initiated at the ITC between 1995 and mid-2007,
using summary data reported by the ITC and detailed notices about
the investigations published in the Federal Register. ITC employees
hand-code this data,120 which has been used in previous scholarly
analyses.121 I considered cases filed after January 1, 1995, the date
on which the statute took its present-day form with the enactment
of the GATT amendments.122
The sample consisted of a total of 219 cases involving at least one
patent.123 Of these, 187 had reached a final outcome, and 32 were
pending (Table 1). While goods from a wide range of industries were
investigated, 59 percent of the cases involved computers or electron-
ics; unsurprising in light of the manufacturing patterns in these
industries. Comparably, district court patent litigation involved
these technology categories only 32 percent of the time.124
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125. In a few cases, the ITC website indicated that the investigation was disposed of
through multiple means. For the purpose of the present analysis, cases that were terminated
through settlement and a finding of no violation or withdrawal of the complaint were coded
as “settled.” Cases in which the investigation was disposed of through withdrawal of the
complaint and a consent order or finding of a violation were coded as “complaint withdrawn.”
Cases that were terminated through the granting of injunctive relief (a cease and desist,
limited exclusion, or general exclusion order), regardless of whether or not a settlement was
also indicated, were coded as a complainant “win.”
126. Cases in which goods came from more than one region were coded in accordance with
the goods’ predominant region of manufacture.
127. Goods from multiple countries may be named in a single section 337 case.
Table 1: Section 337 Cases Studied
Number of Patent Cases Completed Case Outcomes125
Pending 32 Violation Found 45
Completed 187 - Cease and Desist Order 17
Total 219 - Limited Exclusion Order 33
- General Exclusion Order 12
Region of Manufacture126 Violation Not Found 33
Asia 66% Complaint Withdrawn 26
Europe 23% Settled/Consent Order 82
North America 9%
Other 3%
Countries with the Most Cases127 
Country 1995-
2000
2001-2007 Total
- China 18 41 59
- Taiwan 18 38 56
- Japan 8 28 36
- Korea 6 19 25
- Germany 6 17 23
- Hong Kong 11 11 22
- Canada 5 13 18
- Other
  Countries
31 80 111
Total 103 247 350
125126127
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128. See Yahoo!Finance, World Markets, http://finance.yahoo.com/lookup (last visited Sept.
22, 2008). One company, Silicon Integrated Systems Corp., is publicly traded although it does
not show up in the Yahoo!Finance database. See Google Finance, SISC Profile,
http://finance.google.com/finance?q=TPE%3A2363 (last visited Sept. 22, 2008). This party was
coded as a public company.
129. Letter from ITC staff attorney (July 21, 2006) (on file with author).
130. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS, ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
A. Collected Data
I collected three types of data relating to each investigation: party
data, investigation data, and related case data. 
1. Party Data
I collected information on the nationality of all parties involved
in the investigations, focusing on whether each party was foreign or
domestic. Some cases named several plaintiffs and/or defendants.
If an individual group of plaintiffs or defendants included both
domestic and foreign companies, I coded the group as “foreign and
domestic.” I identified each party’s nationality based on the domicile
identified by the ITC, and checked this information against data
published in the Federal Register. To better understand what types
of parties were targeted by section 337 investigations, I checked
the public company status of defendants by using the Lexis-Nexis
DISCLO database. This database contains data on public compa-
nies based on their filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. I supplemented this information with data available
using the stock lookup feature of Yahoo!Finance,128 which tracks
publicly traded U.S. and global securities.
2. Investigation Data 
I collected information on various aspects of each section 337
investigation. Using the ITC’s summary data, I tracked the dis-
puted goods’ country—or in some cases, countries—of origin. I also
captured data on the outcome of each case based on the ITC’s
coding. A complaint may be “withdrawn” before the investigation
has been completed.129 Cases can also be expressly “settled” through
a settlement agreement or consent order.130 Cases adjudicated to
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ASKED QUESTIONS, USITC PUB. NO. 3708, at 22 (July 2004) [hereinafter SECTION 337
INVESTIGATIONS FAQ], available at http://hotdocs.usitc.gov/docs/pubs/trade_remedy/pub
3708.pdf.
131. See generally id. at 30.
132. Id. at 22. 
133. Id. at 23.
134. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f)(2) (2000).
135. SECTION 337 INVESTIGATIONS FAQ, supra note 130, at 22.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Hahn & Singer report fewer parallel cases in their study of ITC investigations. See
Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 480 (reporting 32 parallel cases). That is because they
exclude cases where either the district court or ITC case was settled or dismissed. However,
in the dataset studied in this Article, most parallel cases fell into this category. 
completion result in either “no violation found” or “violation
found.”131 When violations are found, they generally terminate in
one or two types of injunctive relief for a prevailing complainant: a
cease and desist order and/or an exclusion order.132 A cease and
desist order prohibits acts such as selling infringing imported
articles out of U.S. inventory,133 and is enforced by the ITC, with
penalties of up to the greater of $100,000 or twice the domestic
value of the articles per day of violation of the order.134 An exclusion
order directs U.S. Customs to exclude articles from entry into the
United States and there are two kinds:135 A limited exclusion order
applies to infringing goods manufactured by respondents to the
investigation,136 while a general exclusion order—a remedy unique
to the ITC—applies to goods regardless of source.137 The distribution
of cases among these remedies is shown in Table 1. Finally, I cal-
culated the duration of completed cases based on the publication of
the notice of investigation and date of termination of the investiga-
tion.
3. Related Case Data 
Finally, I identified district court cases related to the ITC
investigations and coded a district court case “parallel” to an ITC
investigation if it involved at least one overlapping plaintiff (or
complainant), defendant (or respondent), and patent.138 To complete
my analysis, I used the LIT-REEXAM database in Lexis-Nexis,
which tracks, by patent number, patent litigations in district courts
based on docket information and judgment notices. This database
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139. Letter from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (July 2006) (on file with author);
Telephone Interview with Lexis-Nexis (July 2006).
140. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 26.
141. Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1506
(2003).
142. I also drew upon patent litigation data regarding the technologies litigated in district
courts between 1963 and 1999, which I compared to the technology at issue in ITC
investigations. See generally Allison, supra note 124.
likely understates the number of such litigations due to a lack of
uniform reporting among district courts;139 however, it is the only
aggregate source of such data of which I am aware. 
Using district court docket records available on PACER websites
and Lexis-Nexis’ Courtlink service, I profiled each parallel case to
determine its party posture (for example, whether the parties had
switched positions in the district court litigation or remained in the
same positions as in the ITC litigation), dates of initiation and
termination, and outcome. I also coded defendant nationality data
using data available on PACER. In some cases, the information was
not available on PACER, in which case ITC summary data from the
parallel litigation was used. This information was used to develop
a profile of litigant behavior in parallel suits. 
B. Data Generated by Other Scholars 
To compare ITC and district court patent litigation, I reproduced
published district court patent data from several sources. An in-
depth analysis performed by Jay Kesan and Gwendolyn Ball of
around 6,300 patent cases from 1995, 1997, and 2000 served as the
key source of comparative statistics.140 I reported data from one of
two periods: (1) the year 2000, chosen because it is roughly in the
middle of the 1995-2007 range of the ITC dataset; or, (2) where
there was insufficient data, from a combination of the years 1995,
1997, and 2000. To ensure that the data reported did not reflect any
single year anomalies, I performed, but did not report, separate
confirmatory checks against the 1995 and 1997 Kesan & Ball
district court data, as well as checks against an analysis published
by Kimberly Moore of 4,247 district court patent cases from 1999-
2000.141 The additional data were consistent with the reported data
unless otherwise noted.142 To track post-eBay injunction rates, I
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143. Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Aftermath of eBay v. MercExchange, 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006): A Review of Subsequent Judicial Decisions, J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 631
(2007).
144. Numerical summaries are provided infra in Tables 2, 3, and 4.
used a study by Beckerman-Rodau of district court decisions issued
in the year following the Supreme Court decision.143 Finally, I made
some comparisons to data reported by Hahn & Singer, as noted
below. 
III. RESULTS
A. Patterns of Use of Section 337144
1. Party Nationalities
Section 337 has consistently been promoted as a venue for
protecting domestic industries against foreign piracy. In light of this
provenance, perhaps one of this Article’s most surprising findings
is that section 337 cases have been brought against purely foreign
defendants in only a small minority of recent cases (14 percent)
(Table 2). Complainants initiated investigations against a combina-
tion of foreign and domestic defendants more often than they did
against just foreign defendants (72 percent foreign and domestic
defendants versus 14 percent foreign defendants) (Table 2). Cases
were equally likely to be brought against purely domestic defen-
dants and purely foreign ones (15 percent of defendants were
domestic while 14 percent of defendants were foreign) (Table 2).
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145. Moore, supra note 141, at 1524 n.91, fig.1 (discussing 1990-1999 suits by alienage).
146. Cf. Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 470 n.88 (modifying the ITC’s nationalitys’
coding by (1) excluding from the category “domestic” companies that were subsidiaries of
foreign-based companies, and (2) classifying “foreign and domestic” parties as “foreign,” but
nevertheless reporting, consistent with the current paper, a “trend away from domestic-
versus-foreign [ITC cases]”).
Table 2: Nationalities of Section 337 Litigants
Party Nationalities Number of
Cases % of Total
Complainants
- Foreign Complainant 33 15%
- Domestic Complainant 172 79%
- Foreign and Domestic
  Complainants
14 6%
Respondents  
- Foreign Respondent 31 14%
- Domestic Respondent 33 15%
- Foreign and Domestic
  Respondents
155 72%
On the other hand, U.S. entities overwhelmingly initiated section
337 investigations. Domestic complainants brought 79 percent of the
suits in the dataset, while only 15 percent of the cases were initiated
by foreign complainants (Table 2). Thus, while purely foreign
respondents were uncommon, so were purely foreign complainants.
The relatively low rate of foreign plaintiffs, however, is not limited
to the ITC: 87 percent of district court patent cases are brought by
domestic plaintiffs, and only 13 percent by foreign plaintiffs, despite
roughly equal rates of patenting.145 
These numbers suggest that the party formulation most com-
monly associated with section 337 cases—that of a domestic
complainant opposing a foreign respondent—is only half-right.
While domestic complainants initiated most investigations, only
rarely did they name purely foreign respondents. Most often,
investigations named both domestic and foreign respondents.
Considering party pairings, only 12 percent of cases fit the allegedly
classic profile of a domestic complainant versus a foreign respondent
(Table 3).146 Fifty-five percent of the time, domestic complainants
were pitted against a combination of foreign and domestic respon-
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147. See supra Table 3.
148. Plastic Encapsulated Integrated Circuits, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,388 (U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n Aug. 15, 1990) (notice of investigation No. 337-TA-315).
149. See U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Inv. Nos. 337-TA-381, 337-TA-593, and 337-TA-593. Each
company has been named by Fortune Magazine as one of “America’s Most Admired
Companies” (2008 list available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/
2008/full_list/T.html) (last visited Sept. 22, 2008); Digital Cameras and Component Parts, 72
Fed. Reg. 7906, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-593 (Feb. 21, 2007); Personal Computer/Consumer
dents (Table 3). Indeed, domestic companies were respondents,
either by themselves or together with foreign companies, in 87
percent of the cases in the sample (Table 3).
Table 3: Section 337 Nationality Pairings
Party 
Nationalities
Foreign
Defendant
Domestic
Defendant
Foreign and
Domestic
Defendant
Total
Foreign Plaintiff 1% 1% 13% 15%
Domestic 
Plaintiff
12% 14% 54% 79%
Foreign and 
Domestic 
Plaintiff
1% 0% 5% 6%
Total 14% 15% 72% 100%
The data are surprising in light of the history, intent, and
requirements of the statute. The majority of cases involved domestic
defendants, and 15 percent of the time, no foreign parties were
named at all.147 These cases involved activities of domestic compa-
nies that conduct a portion of their manufacturing abroad, and then
“import” their products back into the United States. In one such
case, the defendants were five U.S. computer chip makers who
manufactured their chips domestically but encapsulated them
abroad using an allegedly infringing process.148 This production
pattern has become increasingly common as U.S. companies
outsource steps in the manufacture and assembly of their products
to foreign countries, particularly in Asia. Investigated goods in the
dataset “made in China” or “made in Japan” included the products
of American brand companies like Texas Instruments, Eastman
Kodak, and Dell.149 These findings reveal a departure in the use of
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Electronic Convergent Devices, 71 Fed. Reg. 503, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-558 (Jan. 4, 2006);
Electronic Products, Including Semiconductor Products, 61 Fed. Reg. 6863, USITC, Inv. No.
337-TA-381 (Feb. 22, 1996).
150. The statute states that a domestic industry exists if, “with respect to the articles
protected ... [there is] (A) significant investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant
employment of labor or capital; or (C) substantial investment in its exploitation, including
engineering, research and development, or licensing.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2000). 
151. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
152. As well as Syria, the United Kingdom, India, and China. See Sildenafil or Any
Pharmaceutically Acceptable Salt, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,749, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-489 (Mar. 6,
2003).
153. Creative makes mp3 players that compete directly with the Apple iPod in the market
for handheld digital music players.
154. Portable Digital Media Players, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,390, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-573
section 337 from its intended purpose of regulating “unfair trade” by
foreign trading partners. 
This departure is further marked by the 15 percent of cases in
which foreign companies initiated ITC investigations (Table 3).
Such companies included Samsung Electronics Company of Korea
and Nikon Corporation of Japan. The activities of such companies
within the United States allow them to meet the “domestic industry”
requirement.150 In a globalized economy, this prerequisite appears
to fail in many cases to differentiate domestic companies from
foreign ones. 
A closer examination of section 337 cases provides one explana-
tion for the high incidence of cases naming a combination of foreign
and domestic defendants. Section 337 outlaws unfair competition or
acts in the importation of articles.151 Investigations thus often name
a would-be importer or distributor of foreign goods based in the
United States as a defendant in addition to a foreign manufacturer
or manufacturers.
Domestic respondents seemed to fall into several distinct cate-
gories. In some cases, the defendants appeared to be domestic
distributors of purely foreign counterfeiters or copyists. One inves-
tigation, for instance, named a domestic company that distributed
counterfeit Viagra manufactured in Belize, Israel, and Nicaragua
throughout the United States.152 In other cases, however, one or
more of the respondents consisted of a sizeable competitor to the
complainant. For instance, in June 2006, Singapore-based Creative
Labs153 initiated an investigation against California-based Apple,
Inc.,154 which manufactures its iPod mp3 and video player in Asia,
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(June 14, 2006).
155. Greg Linden et al., Who Captures Value in a Global Innovation System? The Case of
Apple's iPod, PERSONAL COMPUTING INDUSTRY CENTER 6 tbl.1 (2007), available at
http://pcic.merage.uci.edu/papers/2007/AppleiPod.pdf. 
156. For more on the history, see supra Part I.
157. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 761 (Thomson West 2006).
with components from China (hard drive), Japan (display), Taiwan
(processor and CPU), and Korea (memory).155 The procedural
posture of a foreign competitor suing an innovative American
company, as demonstrated by Creative suing Apple, is the opposite
of what one might expect, given the history of the statute.156
To determine whether or not Section 337 defendants were more
likely to represent “competitors” or “counterfeiters,” I tracked the
public company status of section 337 defendants in the dataset.
Counterfeiters are typically private enterprises that try to hide their
identities to avoid detection.157 As such, public companies are less
likely to be counterfeiters and more likely to be engaged in legiti-
mate businesses.
As reported in Table 4, public companies were named as respon-
dents in 58 percent of the investigations. Public companies com-
posed 57 percent of domestic respondents, 52 percent of foreign
respondents, and 60 percent of foreign and domestic respondents
(Table 4). This further confirms that the image of section 337 as a
weapon for use primarily against “foreign pirates” is at best an
oversimplification. Rather than being used strictly against “foreign-
ers,” section 337 cases have been brought against domestic and
foreign respondents in equal proportions. In addition, section 337
investigations are more often than not against named public
company respondents, who are less likely to represent “counterfeit”
or “pirate” companies.
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158. I characterized respondents as “public company” when at least one respondent was
a public company. 
159. See, e.g., DUVALL, supra note 90, at 37 (noting a number of recent cases against
domestic entities that “involve factual circumstances which, arguably, were not necessarily
contemplated by or within the legislative intent of Section 337”); Hahn & Singer, supra note
16, at 470 n.89 (reporting a “[deviation] from [the ITC’s] traditional role and original mission
of protecting U.S. manufacturers from foreign infringers”).
160. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text (discussing the rise in section 337 cases).
161. Parallel suits identified using LIT-REEXAM Database in Lexis-Nexis, see supra note
139 and accompanying text, and methodology described in “Methods” section. See supra Part
II. An additional 23 percent (50 out of 219) of the suits involved patents that were in district
court disputes involving different parties, as indicated in the LIT-REEXAM Database. All
told, there was close to a 90 percent likelihood that, for any given ITC dispute, at least one
of the patents litigated was also at some point the subject of a district court dispute.
Table 4: Public Company Status of Section 337 Respondents
Public Company 
Respondent?
Public Companies as Percent of
Total Respondents
Foreign Respondent 52%
Domestic Respondent 57%
Foreign and Domestic
Respondents
158
60%
Total 58%
158
The data discredit the perception that section 337 unfairly singles
out foreign defendants. In most actions against foreigners, U.S.
companies are also named as defendants. As such, they confirm
what has been observed by others: that section 337 is being used
beyond its statutory intent to target domestic as well as foreign
companies.159
B. Parallel Litigation
Another justification for the ITC is that it provides a forum for
addressing cases that district courts cannot through, for example,
its in rem jurisdiction, rapid schedule, and special remedies.160
Based on this logic, one would expect low rates of parallel litigation
between the two venues. The data, however, show a potentially
surprising result—that at least 65 percent (143 out of 219) of ITC
cases involved patents that were also the subject of district court
litigation between the same parties (Table 5).161 As shown in
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162. In part this can be explained by the overlapping—but not identical—jurisdiction of the
ITC and district court. 
163. Two high-profile ITC disputes that illustrate this strategy are the “3G wars” between
Broadcom and Qualcomm. See Creative Tech. v. Apple Computer, No. 06-3218 (N.D. Cal. May
15, 2006); Broadcom v. Qualcomm, No. 05-1958 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2005); Broadcom v.
Qualcomm, No. 05-3350 (C.D.N.J. July 1, 2005);  Broadcom v. Qualcomm, No. 05-468 (C.D.
Cal. May 18, 2005); Broadcom v. Qualcomm, No. 05-467 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2005); Portable
Digital Media Players, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,390, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-573 (June 14, 2006);
Certain Baseband Processor Chips and Chipsets, Transmitter and Receiver (Radio) Chips,
Table 6, the overwhelming majority of these cases were litigated at
the same time. 
Table 5: Parallel Litigation Between the ITC and District Court
ITC Patent Cases Cases
Parallel suit filed in district court 65% (143)
No parallel suit in district court 35% (76)
Most of the time (89 percent), the ITC investigation was initiated
after the district court case had been filed, and 85 percent of the
time, the same party initiated both cases (Table 6). On average, 6.6
months elapsed between the filing of the investigations.
Table 6: Litigant Behavior in Parallel Suits (N=145) 
In which venue was
the case first brought?
Did the same party
initiate both cases?
Did the cases over-
lap in time?
District
Court
89% Yes 85% Yes 97%
ITC 11% No 15% No 3%
These findings undermine to some degree the argument for the
necessity of the ITC: that without it, parties would not have their
cases heard. More often than not, ITC complainants are also
initiating suit in district courts, although the cases may involve
different sets of defendants.162 Furthermore, in most cases the same
plaintiff initiated both the ITC and the district court suits (usually
with the district court suit filed prior to the ITC suit), and litigated
both simultaneously (Table 6). As such, the ITC has often been used
not as a last resort or because it is the only option, but as part of a
broader enforcement strategy.163 
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Power Control Chips, and Products Containing Same, Including Cellular Telephone Handsets,
70 Fed. Reg. 35,707, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 21, 2005). In each case, multiple U.S.
district court and ITC suits were initiated, raising the stakes for each party to the litigation.
In addition, as intellectual property protections are increasingly promoted in manufacturing
hubs such as China, localized enforcement will present an additional option. See Stephanie
M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China, 45  AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 372 (2008). Such
enforcement upstream in the supply chain has the benefit of addressing sales not only in the
United States, but in other destinations as well.
164. N=143 cases.
165. N=122 cases, as 21 of the 143 parallel litigation cases involved ITC respondents
initiating suit in district court (for instance, in a declaratory judgment action).
At the same time, 35 percent of ITC cases did not have a district
court counterpart. In such cases, the ITC appears to be filling a
void—through its jurisdiction, remedies, and speed—left by district
courts. The enlarged jurisdiction of the ITC is evident even in the
event of parallel litigation as ITC cases often included defendants
not named in the parallel district court case. In some cases, these
additional defendants were foreigners: while 85 percent of ITC cases
named at least one foreign respondent, only 67 percent of district
court cases did (Table 7).
Table 7: Respondent/Defendant Nationalities in Parallel Cases
Respondent/Defendant 
Nationalities
 ITC Cases164 District Court
Cases165
Domestic Only 15% 35%
Foreign Only 12% 13%
Foreign and Domestic 73% 52%
Total Cases with at least one
Foreign Defendant 
85% 65%
164 165
Taken together, the data suggest that the ITC is being used not
only for its statutory purpose, but well beyond it. Around a third of
the time, the ITC appears to create an option or at least provide a
favorable alternative to district court. In the other 65 percent of
cases, both ITC and district court cases are being brought over the
same dispute. In addition, while ITC respondents often include
foreign companies, as intended by Congress, they are also increas-
ingly including domestic companies and public companies.
Overall, the changing patterns of use of the ITC reinforce its
growing popularity. However, the high rate of parallel litigation also
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166. See Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 461-62 nn.25-29 (describing the “perception that
patent holders enjoy an advantage at the ITC”).
167. See supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
168. The pre-filing investigation required prior to an ITC suit has been described as “vastly
more extensive than that required in district court.” See Patent Litigation Before the U.S.
International Trade Commission from the Patent Holder's Perspective, DLA PIPER NEWS &
INSIGHTS, Jan. 13, 2002, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/global/publications/detail.aspx?
pub=412). It is customary, for instance, for complainants to confidentially submit draft
complaints to the ITC prior to formal submission of a complaint at the ITC. 19 C.F.R. § 210.12
(2007). No comparable mechanism exists in district court.
169. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
seems to indicate that it provides an incomplete solution to the
problem of import-related infringement. This could provide a just-
ification for combining the virtues of both venues, as discussed in
Part IV.
C. Section 337 vs. District Court Outcomes 
In addition to the charge of protectionism, the charge of bias
against defendants has been levied against the ITC.166 To empiri-
cally test this and other claims made about the ITC, I compared ITC
and district court litigant behavior and outcomes using several
criteria: the plaintiff win rate, injunction rate, case duration, and
case disposition. I generated and reported these statistics based on
the entire ITC dataset and comparable district court statistics
reported by other sources. In some cases, however, differences in
outcomes and litigant behavior are likely due to differences in the
types of cases filed in the ITC versus a district court. As has been
previously noted, the ITC has different prerequisites for bringing
suits and requires its complainants to be prepared for rapid
discovery.167 It also has procedures to weed out the weakest cases
prior to initiation of an investigation.168 The ITC follows different
procedures and offers different remedies than district courts.169 All
of these factors may lead to differences in the type and quality of
cases filed in the two venues.
To control for the impact of this pre-litigation selection bias, I
replicated my analysis for the subset of ITC cases that had parallel
district court litigations as previously defined. This dataset also has
its biases, introduced by the additional dynamic associated with
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170. See supra Table 5. 
171. “Fully adjudicated” refers to cases that were not settled or dismissed on a non-merit
basis. For the ITC dataset, as described in the Methods section, I coded as a “win” cases in
which a violation was found, resulting in a cease and desist order, a limited exclusion order,
and/or a general exclusion order. See supra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
172. I used a standard chi-square test to examine the null hypothesis that complainants
in the ITC and plaintiffs in district court were equally likely to win, yielding a p-value of  4.97
x e-5. A p-value of less than .05 is generally interpreted as an indication that the null
hypothesis can be rejected (making it statistically significant), while a value greater than 0.10
is viewed as showing that any differences are not statistically significant. Based on the data
presented, ITC complainants did significantly better than did district court plaintiffs. Based
on the data, the null hypothesis can be rejected. To perform this and other chi-square
pursuing litigation, usually simultaneously, in the two venues.170
This approach also limits both the number of relevant cases and the
ability to draw statistical conclusions based on them. These caveats,
however, do not compromise the usefulness of studying a dataset for
which selection bias has been controlled.
I report the results below. The larger dataset is reported below
as “cases filed in either the ITC or district court.” The smaller
dataset—of ITC cases with a district court counterpart—is identified
below as “cases filed at both the ITC and district court.” When
differences in the metrics of the ITC and district court were
significant across both sets of data, I concluded that the differences
were correlated with, and potentially attributable to, differences
between the ITC and district court venues, at least in part.
1. Plaintiff Win Rates
The ITC has been accused of stacking the odds against defen-
dants. To test for the presence of an anti-defendant bias, I compared
win rates between fully adjudicated ITC and district court cases.171
Although this methodology only measures bias in adjudication,
nearly half of the ITC cases go to trial (Table 10), making an
adjudicated win a meaningful basis for comparison. Of the 77 ITC
cases in the dataset that reached a final determination, 58 percent
were resolved in the complainant’s favor (Table 8). I compared this
figure to comparable trial outcomes at district courts (Table 8). The
results were striking: complainants at the ITC were significantly
more likely to win (58 percent complainant win rate) than were
plaintiffs in district court (35 percent plaintiff win rate).172 Taken by
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calculations described in this Article, I used the CHITEST function in Microsoft Excel.
173. See, e.g., Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 476 (pointing to such a disparity in win
rates as evidence of a likely pro-plaintiff bias at the ITC). However, as they acknowledge in
their conclusion, this difference could also be attributable to “selection bias issues” which, due
to the size of their controlled sample, are left largely unresolved. Id. at 490. Selection
differences between the ITC and district court are controlled for in the present analysis as
described in Section C. See infra Part III.C.
174. N=77 adjudicated ITC cases in the dataset, 45 of which were resolved in favor of the
complainant. See supra Table 1. The complainant win rate of cases resolved upon a motion
for summary determination was 67 percent (14 out of 21 cases), and 55 percent upon non-
summary determination (31 out of 56 cases).
175. N=597 summary judgment, jury trial, bench trial, and judgment as a matter of law
verdicts in 1995, 1997, and 2000, 207 of which resulted in a finding of infringement; see Kesan
& Ball, supra note 26, at tbls.4-7; see also Moore, Black Box,  supra note 26, at 384, tbl.1, 394
tbl.5 (reporting a weighted average patentee win rate of 38 percent based on a dataset of 223
bench and jury trials and cases involving 887 patents (actual number of cases not reported)
resolved on summary judgment in 2000).
176. N=49 ITC cases in the dataset, 27 of which were decided for the complainant, meaning
that the null hypothesis could not be rejected as an explanation for the results. 
177. N=10 district court cases in the dataset, 4 of which were decided for the plaintiff.
178. I used a standard chi-square test to test the null hypothesis that complainants at the
ITC and plaintiffs in district court were equally likely to win. This yielded a p-value of 0.8,
meaning that the null hypothesis could not be rejected as an explanation for the results.
179. Among cases filed at both the ITC and district court, I used a standard (Pearson’s) chi
itself, this statistic would seem to support the contention that the
ITC is biased in favor of plaintiffs.173
Table 8: Win Rates in Adjudicated Cases 
Plaintiff/Complainant Win Rates in
Adjudicated Cases
ITC District
Court
Cases filed in either the ITC or 
district court
 58%
174
 35%
175
Cases filed at both the ITC and 
district court 
 54%
176
 50%
177
174 175 176 177
The difference in win rates, however, was significantly smaller
among cases filed in both venues. Complainants won 54 percent of
the time at the ITC and plaintiffs won 50 percent of the time at
district courts, not a statistically significant difference.178 Fewer
cases met this description—while final decisions were issued in 49
ITC cases in the dataset that had a district court counterpart
(concurrent or subsequent), only 10 district court cases that had an
ITC counterpart were adjudicated to completion.179 This is because
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square test to test the null hypothesis that complainants in the ITC and plaintiffs in district
court were equally likely to win. This yielded a p-value of 0.5, meaning that the null
hypothesis could not be rejected as an explanation for the results.
180. Ninety-two percent, or 92 out of 99 cases not transferred or pending. Eighty-seven
percent of such cases settled. See supra Table 1.
181. But see Hahn & Singer, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
among the district court cases with ITC counterparts studied, the
overwhelming majority settled.180 
Based on the data, it appears that the difference between ITC and
district court win rates is more likely attributable to litigant
decisions about what cases to bring in which venue than to a pro-
plaintiff bias at the ITC. Indeed, while some of the ITC’s features,
such as its lax discovery rules, can benefit plaintiffs, other features,
such as the presence of an OUII attorney, can work to the advan-
tage of defendants. The OUII attorney represents the “public
interest” of allowing free trade in the absence of unfair competition,
and in pursuing this interest, can compensate for a weak defendant.
The relatively higher plaintiff win rates in district court cases that
had an ITC counterpart may be due to any number of factors,
including the presence of stronger plaintiffs, weaker defendants, or
simply stronger cases in the ITC as compared to district court.
When parties filed in both venues and adjudicated those cases to
completion, which only occurred in a small number of cases, the
difference in ITC and district court plaintiff win rate was not
statistically significant. 
Taken together, these results do not support a major allegation
that has been made about the ITC: that it is unfairly biased against
defendants. The data studied, while limited in size, found compara-
ble win rates among cases filed in both venues.181 At the same time,
the dataset is too small and inexhaustive to rule out any possibility
of bias.
2. Injunctive Relief
In comparing ITC and district court outcomes, I considered how
often the ITC granted permanent injunctive relief upon a finding of
a section 337 violation/infringement and request for injunctive
relief. As described above, district courts, following the eBay
decision, no longer automatically award injunctions to prevailing
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182. The small numbers of parallel district court cases adjudicated to completion (three)
make it impossible to make meaningful comparisons between adjudication rates of cases filed
in both district and ITC court. 
183. N=77 adjudicated cases at the ITC in which a violation was found and the complaint
was not withdrawn, 77 of which resulted in either a cease and desist order, exclusion (limited
or general) order; or both (i.e., a 100 percent rate of injunction among prevailing plaintiffs).
See supra Table 1.
184. N= 28 cases, 22 of which resulted in a permanent injunction and 6 of which resulted
in a denial of a request for permanent injunction. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 143, at
Appx. fig. 1 & 2, and n.346.
185. I performed a standard Chi-square test to examine the null hypothesis that prevailing
parties requesting injunctions were equally likely to get them in district court as they would
be in the ITC. This yielded a p-value of 2.87 x e-05, meaning that the null hypothesis could be
rejected as an explanation for the result.
patentees who seek them. The ITC, on the other hand, continues to
follow the mandate that it “shall” award relief in the event of a
violation.  Unsurprisingly, this difference is reflected in the data
(Table 9). 
Table 9: Injunctive Relief182 
Adjudicated Cases in which 
Permanent Injunction Awarded
ITC District
Court
Cases filed in either the ITC or
district court in which 
infringement/violation found 
 100%183  79%184
183184
Although prevailing patentees were likely to get injunctions in
district court, they were essentially guaranteed to get them in the
ITC (79 percent injunction rate vs. 100 percent injunction rate). The
difference was statistically significant,185 and confirms the percep-
tion that injunctions are a “sure thing” in the ITC, while no longer
so in district court. This difference further explains why litigants
may chose to file in the ITC despite the availability of injunctive
relief in district courts.
3. Litigant Behavior and Case Durations
While case adjudications provide a useful point of comparison
between the ITC and district courts, many cases in both venues are
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186. The district court settlement rate does not include cases settled after the district court
decided the issue of liability. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 26, at 266 n.193.
187. I performed a standard chi-square test to examine two null hypotheses: (1) parties
were equally likely to settle in ITC and district court, and (2) parties were equally likely to
adjudicate their claims in ITC and district courts. The results were, respectively, p-value of
9.2 x e-13 and p-value of 1.4 x e-35, indicating that both null hypotheses could be rejected.
188. N=186 completed cases for which there was an outcome. See supra Table 1 (reporting
78 adjudications, 82 settlements, and 26 dismissals/non-merit dispositions).
189. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 26, at 274 tbl.6 (N=1,965, based on 2000 data).
Adjudicated cases included summary judgments, trial judgments, and dismissals with
prejudice; “settled cases” included identified settlements, consent judgments, and stipulated,
agreed, and voluntary dismissals; dismissed or withdrawn cases included cases dismissed
without prejudice or for lack of jurisdiction or want of prosecution, default judgments, and
voluntary dismissals where the complaint was not answered. 
resolved prior to summary judgment or trial. Accordingly, I con-
sidered litigant behavior and case duration as determinants of the
extent of divergence in outcomes between the ITC and district
courts. 
I observed striking differences in the resolution of ITC and
district court cases. To begin, ITC litigants were considerably less
likely to settle. While nearly 70 percent of district court cases
settled,186 only 42 percent of parties to ITC investigations settled
(Table 10). ITC litigants were also much more likely to adjudicate
their disputes to an end. ITC investigations were fully adjudicated
(at trial or summary judgment) 44 percent of the time, or four times
the rate of adjudication in district court. The differences between
the venues in settlement and adjudication are significant, using a
conventional statistical approach for significance testing.187 
Table 10: Case Resolution
Cases Filed at Either the
ITC or District Court
ITC
188
 District
Court
189
Adjudicated cases  44% 11%
Settled cases  42% 68%
Non-merit dispositions  14% 20%
188189 
I performed a similar comparison on the parallel subset of cases
that had been filed in the ITC and district courts in order to control
for any selection bias. The difference in outcomes was even more
pronounced: ITC investigations were nearly six times more likely to
be adjudicated (41 percent of the time) than their district court
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190. N=99 district court cases, 7 percent of which were resolved at summary judgment or
trial, and 93 percent of which were settled or dismissed, and 117 ITC cases, 41 percent of
which were adjudicated, 45 percent of which were settled, and 14 percent of which were
withdrawn. The 7 percent does not include cases that were dismissed with prejudice. 
191. I used the ITC and district court data to perform a standard chi-square test to
examine the null hypothesis that the two parties were equally likely to adjudicate their claims
in ITC and district courts, resulting in a p-value of 7.59x e-8, indicating that the null
hypothesis could be rejected.
192. Compare Kesan & Ball, supra note 26, at 305-07 figs.17-20, with the author’s own
analysis of durations in the current dataset (showing interquartile case duration ranges in
settled cases of 6.3 months in the ITC versus 11.4 months in district courts, and interquartile
duration ranges in adjudicated cases of 4.3 months in the ITC versus 22.3 months in district
courts).
193. See infra Table 11.
194. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 26, at 288 tbl.13 (showing that the top decile of case
durations among patent litigations in 2000 that had been resolved by the time of the article’s
publication in 2005 had lasted, on average, four and a half years).
counterparts (7 percent of the time),190 a statistically significant
difference.191
Part of the greater disparity in adjudication is likely due to the
ability of defendants to stay district court cases when a parallel ITC
case is  pending pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659. Stays were applied in
60 percent (82 out of 137) of district court cases overlapping in time
with its ITC counterpart. Still, even when section 1659 stays were
not applied, the ITC was more likely to litigate and less likely to
settle than its district court counterparts. What drove this differ-
ence? One factor may be the certainty and predictability that
accompanies ITC adjudication. The timing of an ITC suit is fairly
predictable, with a schedule set out well in advance and recalibrated
as new information becomes available. Of the cases studied, 90
percent were resolved within eighteen months. The comparable
dataset of district court cases reported by Kesan and Ball, on the
other hand, was relatively less clustered, characterized by a “long
tail,” or wide distribution, of case durations.192 Thus, while on
average a district court case took about twice as long as an ITC case
to fully litigate,193 some district court cases took much longer than
that.194
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195. I also compared durations of cases filed and completed in the ITC and district court,
which were characterized by a more dramatic difference in durations.  (N=97 cases completed
in both venues). On average, the ITC adjudicated cases in 15.2 months, versus 34.2 in district
courts; settled cases in 6.8 months, versus 19.2 in district courts; and cases were dismissed
or withdrawn in 6.8 months, versus 3.2 in district courts. 
196. N=187 completed cases in the dataset.
197. Kesan & Ball, supra note 26, at 288, tbl.13 (2000 data) (I used the data reported for
“settlement” cases rather than “settlement and probable settlement”: the difference in means
is only eight days).
198. The statute states that in the event of a violation, infringing articles “shall” be
excluded from entry into the United States unless the exclusion is against public interest. 19
U.S.C. § 1337(d) (2000). Injunctive relief to a prevailing complainant has been denied only
three times. 
Table 11: Case Duration
Average Duration of Cases Filed
in Either the ITC and District
Court (in Months)197
ITC195 District
Court196
Adjudicated cases 14 26
Settled cases 9.4 13
Cases dismissed or withdrawn 6.2 -
195196197
In addition, the remedy in an ITC case is also relatively certain;
if a violation is found, the court generally “shall” award injunctive
relief,198 in the form of a cease and desist order and/or an exclusion
order. The lack of a jury and the unavailability of money damages
remove a significant source of uncertainty, and generally limit the
respondent’s exposure. For example, the lack of damages reduces
informational asymmetries between the two parties, by making less
relevant one party’s private intentions to delay discovery or provide
damages evidence. The limited range of possible relief in the ITC
also constrains gaps between party expectations regarding the
outcomes of any litigation, in contrast to district courts, where
defendants and plaintiffs often have vast differences in how they
predict the case will be resolved. Adjudicating in the ITC thus may
carry less financial and timing risk than is present in district courts.
The structure and schedule of ITC cases may also likely discour-
age settlement. ITC investigations do not generally include
Markman hearings, for instance, which serve as a natural interim
2008] PATENTLY PROTECTIONIST? 103
199. See Eden, supra note 15, ¶ 15 n.31.
200. See supra Table 10.
201. See supra Table 11.
202. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
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204. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
point for settlement in district courts.199 In addition, the fast pace of
ITC cases leaves little time for settlement negotiations to take place.
In contrast, delays in district court cases, potentially introduced by
a variety of factors, encourage settlement as parties seek to clear
the cloud of uncertainty created by patent litigation. 
Whatever the specific reasons, it appears that the differences
between ITC and district court litigation are correlated with and
have likely led to a significant difference in litigant behavior. Cases
in the ITC are much more likely to be fully adjudicated than similar
district court cases.200 In addition, ITC cases are decided more
quickly,201 and the range of possible outcomes more limited.202
IV. RETHINKING THE ITC-DISTRICT COURT INTERFACE
The converging jurisdiction and diverging standards of the ITC
and district court present issues for both patentees and defendants.
A patentee with a valid and infringed patent must file in both a
district court and the ITC in order to access both sets of remedies.
The defenses available and the standard for injunctive relief differ
by venue, increasing the likelihood of different outcomes and
encouraging parallel filings.203 The lack of claim preclusion of ITC
decisions on district courts204 means that section 337 decisions,
however efficiently issued, lack the finality of district court rulings.
Since section 337 cases are generally decided before their district
court counterparts,205 the possibility of readjudication lingers,
though it has been infrequently invoked.
The data strengthen the argument for increased coordination
between the two venues and suggest why the issues are not likely
to resolve themselves. While the ITC offers significant benefits to
litigants, the relief provided is neither complete nor final. In
addition, the procedural and substantive differences between the
ITC and district courts create incentives for litigants to file in both
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206. 28 U.S.C. § 1659(b) (2000). 
207. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1996). 
208. USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-481 and Case No. 3:02cv1300 (N.D. Ca. 2001); USITC, Inv.
No. 337-TA-371 and Case No 2:95cv00134 (D.N.J. 2006).
209. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 268, 274 (D.N.J. 2001)
(“In analyzing the prior decisions in this matter this Court is mindful of the findings and
opinions rendered by the ALJ and ITC .... However, while such findings and opinions serve
a persuasive value, they do not receive any deferential treatment nor do they have a
preclusive effect on any findings and opinions rendered by this Court.”); see also Tex.
Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1568. But see Thomson Consumer Elecs., Inc. v. Innovation, SA, 3 F.
Supp. 2d 49, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[I]f there is appellate review of the ITC’s claim construction
in this dispute, that will certainly have a pronounced effect, and in practical terms the stare
decisis effect of appellate review of the ITC construction would have near-preclusive effect
with respect to any review of this Court’s construction.”). Note, however, that this holding is
limited to situations in which the Federal Circuit has ruled on the ITC’s claim construction
prior to the district court’s consideration.
venues that go beyond those associated with filing suits in multiple
district courts, which will at least apply the same substantive law.
As the number of parallel actions grows, so does the risk of
relitigation of the same issues of validity and infringement in both
venues.
Is the threat of duplicative litigation a real one? Though the ITC’s
findings do not formally preclude district courts from deciding them,
the ITC record is admissible as evidence in district courts following
the dissolution of a stay due to a parallel proceeding in the ITC.206
In addition, the Federal Circuit has stated that “[the] district court
can attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decision
that it considers justified.”207 Even though, theoretically, a plaintiff
could litigate both cases to completion, I identified only two
instances in which both the ITC and district court case were
litigated to an adjudicated outcome, both in agreement.208
Nonetheless, there appears to be some evidence of duplication.
Even though the ITC’s findings have “persuasive value,” courts have
declined to accord them deferential treatment or preclusive effect.209
In addition, despite the availability of automatic stays of parallel
district court cases, 40 percent of the time (55 out of 137), the
district court case proceeded without a stay. District courts may
decline to issue a complete stay if the district court action involves
patents, defendants, or issues additional to the ones asserted in the
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210. See Organon Teknika Corp. v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., No. 1:95cv00865, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3798, at **4-5 (Feb. 19, 1997) (granting a limited stay of district court
proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659 covering the four patents in the ITC case, but not
the additional seven patents in the district court dispute). But see FormFactor, Inc. v.
Micronics Japan Co., 2008 WL 361128, at *1 (Feb. 11, 2008) (granting a stay of the entire
district court action even though only two of the four patents in the district court case were
at issue in the ITC case.). I am grateful to Mark Smith’s entry on Santa Clara Law School’s
Tech Law Forum website (www.techlawforum.net) for drawing my attention to this case. 
211. In the Matter of Certain Flooring Prods., USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-443 (Mar. 22, 2002)
(notice of final determination).
212. Alloc v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 342 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
213. Alloc Inc. v. Unilin Decor NV (E.D. Wis. Case 2:00-cv-00999) (April 20, 2007) (order
of dismissal).
214. N=39 district court cases in which a section 1659 stay was issued and in which the
dispute was resolved at both the ITC and district court, 29 of which were resolved within 9
months of ITC case resolution.
215. N=39 cases resolved at both the ITC and district court and in which a section 1659
stay was issued, 10 of which were resolved more than 9 months after resolution of the ITC
case. Mean incremental time to resolution was 28 months, median incremental time to
resolution was 22 months.
ITC action.210 A defendant sued in both ITC and district court
venues may not even want to stay the district court action, because
a stay would create further delays in case resolution.
Patentees are at times using the ITC and district court to relit-
igate the same issues.  An example is the case of Alloc Inc. v. Unilin
Decor NV. Although the parallel ITC case was resolved in favor of
the accused infringer in 2002,211 as affirmed by the Federal Circuit
in 2003,212 the district court case was not resolved until 2007, when
it settled.213 This case does not represent the norm in stayed
cases—nearly 75 percent of the time when a district court case was
stayed and the ITC case decided, the district court case was also
resolved, almost always through settlement, within 9 months.214
However, the remaining quarter of stayed district court cases took
an average of 28 months beyond the ITC outcome to resolve.215 In
addition, 40 percent of the time when the district court case had an
ITC counterpart, no stay was applied at all. These district court
cases proceeded somewhat independently of their ITC counterparts,
increasing the likelihood that the venues were being used to get
“two bites at the apple.” 
This Article discusses two possible approaches to strengthening
coordination between the venues to reduce the likelihood of
duplication. First, the overlap between the two venues could be
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216. For a more detailed description of this effect, see supra at Part III.A.
reduced. This could be accomplished by more narrowly tailoring
the ITC venue to address true gaps in district court jurisdiction. As
a second option, the opposite could be done: the overlap between
the ITC and district court could be increased, by harmonizing the
remedies available in each venue and obviating the need for liti-
gants to file in both. As discussed below, this Article finds the latter
option more attractive.
A. Reduce Overlap Between the Venues
A simple approach to reducing the risk of inconsistent results
from the ITC and district courts would be to clearly distinguish the
jurisdiction of the two venues. This would realign the ITC with its
original purpose and obviate the need for greater coordination
between the venues, because as a result, suits could only be brought
in one venue or the other. This could be accomplished by restricting
ITC jurisdiction to defendants over which a district court lacks
personal jurisdiction, a factor which is not currently taken into
account. Giving the ITC jurisdiction over only those defendants who
cannot be sued in district courts would more directly address the
jurisdictional void that the ITC was created to fill. This would
probably be a simpler mechanism to implement than other ways of
dividing jurisdiction over patent claims between the venues.
Limiting the ITC’s jurisdiction, however, has its drawbacks. It
could reduce the number of disputes eligible for section 337’s rapid
resolution and other benefits. It could also increase the practice of
filing separate but related proceedings against different sets of
defendants in both the ITC and district courts, which is somewhat
inefficient.216 Moreover, a restriction on section 337’s jurisdiction
could be effected only through congressional modification; this
would be unlikely to gain support in light of the ITC’s increasing
popularity. 
Another way to reduce overlap between the venues would be to
eliminate the overlap in remedies between the ITC and district
courts. Currently, the ITC can award cease and desist orders,
limited exclusion orders, and general exclusion orders to prevailing
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AIPLA Q.J. 43, 65 (2008).
219. See Bryan A. Schwartz, Remedy and Bonding Law Under Section 337: A Primer for
the Patent Litigator, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 121, 139 (1989).
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patentees.217 District courts are empowered to offer injunctions that
approximate the first two types of orders, but cannot offer general
exclusion orders, which bind nonparties as well as parties to the
suit.218
The ITC awards general exclusion orders only to complainants
that meet a heightened standard.219 Making general exclusion
orders the only remedy available in the ITC would effectively limit
the ITC’s jurisdiction to disputes that qualify. This way, the ITC
could continue to address the multiple-infringer scenario for which
it was originally intended, but it would not hear disputes that could
just as easily be resolved in a district court. By forcing plaintiffs
that seek cease and desist or limited exclusion orders to request
them from a district court, such a reform would substantially
decrease the overlap between ITC and district court decisions.
Limiting the remedies available in the ITC would dramatically
shrink use of the venue. In the eleven years covered by the dataset,
only twelve general exclusion orders have issued.220 Making general
exclusion orders the only remedy available at the ITC would create
its own gaps in coverage. Plaintiffs that do not qualify for general
exclusion orders—which under this proposal would be a prerequisite
to be heard in the ITC—and also lack the jurisdiction needed to
bring their cases in district courts would be left without a remedy.
This approach would thus suffer from some of the same problems
that limiting the ITC’s jurisdiction would create, although the high
rate of parallel litigation suggests that the number of “stranded”
cases would be limited. The goal of both of these reforms, however,
would be to refocus the ITC on the specific problems of foreign
infringement that cannot be addressed by district courts while
filtering out litigants merely looking for a quick venue. 
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221. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 133-37  and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., San Huan New Materials High Tech v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 161 F.3d 1347,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (affirming the ability of the ITC to assess civil penalties against parties
that violate consent orders).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
225. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442,
455 (1977); Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974); see also Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412, 418 n.4 (1987).
B. Harmonize the Venues
Another approach would be to increase the overlap between the
venues by harmonizing the remedies and the substantive law in the
ITC and district courts. With respect to remedies, a prevailing
complainant in the ITC currently has no way to obtain damages
unless the complainant relitigates the dispute in a district court.221
Likewise, a prevailing plaintiff in a district court cannot take
advantage of U.S. Customs enforcement or obtain a general
exclusion order against future reincarnations of the infringer unless
they also prevail in a complaint at the ITC.222 Allowing each venue
to offer the same or substantially the same available remedies
would decrease the need for plaintiffs to file in both. 
This could be accomplished in a number of ways. One way would
be to reform the ITC to award money damages. Currently, the ITC
can impose penalties on respondents who fail to comply with its
orders prohibiting future infringement.223 It could potentially be
reformed to also award penalties for past infringement. Empowering
the ITC, which lacks a jury, to award damages might appear to run
afoul of the Seventh Amendment, which preserves the right to a
jury “in suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars ....”224 The Supreme Court, however, has held
that the Seventh Amendment is not applicable to administrative
proceedings.225 A drawback of asking the ITC to decide damages,
however, is that it could add complexity and time to the ITC’s
decision-making process. Such complexity could be avoided if
damages were available in district courts on the basis of an ITC
decision on liability. This would allow prevailing section 337
complainants to get damages without having to conduct another
trial. 
2008] PATENTLY PROTECTIONIST? 109
226. Telephone Interview with ITC staff attorney (Feb. 2008).
227. This Article declines to press the argument that defenses in the ITC and district
courts be harmonized. To date, the 271(g) defenses have been ligitated in only 12 published
cases (analysis based on search in Lexis-Nexis of all case decisions through April 2008 with
the term “materially changed by subsequent processes” or “a trivial and nonessential
component of another product,” which yielded 23 hits, 12 of which comprised cases in which
one of the defenses was at issue in the litigation). In addition, the ITC arguably reaches the
35 U.S.C. § 271(g)(2) inquiry, through its consideration of the value of an infringing
component relative to its downstream products, and the incremental benefits and detriments
of including a downstream product in an exclusion order see a description of the EPROMs
test, supra note 100.
228. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 143, at 654 (“In almost every case in which a court
denied a permanent injunction for patent infringement, the patent owner was a non-
practicing entity.”).
229. In the dataset, two cases were identified as likely brought by patent trolls. See Certain
Point of Sale Terminals and Components Thereof, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-524 (Jul. 28, 2005)
(brought by Verve LLC, an “Intellectual Property holding, licensing, and consulting firm”);
Certain Digital Cameras and Component Parts Thereof, USITC, Inv. No. 337-TA-593 (Feb.
21, 2007) (brought by St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants, Inc., “an IP holding firm”);
see also Eric Bangeman, Permanent injunctions getting scarce; patent holders turn to ITC,
ARS TECHNICA, June 3, 2007, available at http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070603-
permanent-injunctions-getting-scarce-patent-holders-turn-to-itc.html; ITC Launches
Investigation of Verve Patent Claims Against Major Players in the Point-of-Sale Terminal
Industry, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 2, 2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_
As opposed to offering district court remedies at the ITC, it might
be easier to offer the ITC’s remedies in district courts. For instance,
in cases where imports are involved, district courts could provide for
enforcement by U.S. Customs and offer general exclusion orders.
Currently, with the preclusionary effect of district court rulings on
the ITC, parties should be able to get these additional remedies if
they bring their district court verdicts to the ITC. This does not
appear to be a common practice, however, not least because few
district court cases with ITC counterparts have been adjudicated to
completion.226 An abbreviated process that reduces the issues before
the ITC to the issues not already addressed by the district court
(i.e., proving a domestic industry) may be appropriate. 
The standard for granting injunctions should also be harmo-
nized.227 Currently, the ITC is not bound by the eBay standard for
injunctive relief. This creates a gap in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence that may attract patent trolls who are much less
likely under eBay to obtain injunctions from district courts to the
ITC.228 Though the number of filings by patent trolls at the ITC thus
far has been small,229 as post-eBay case law develops and trolls
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230. See, e.g., Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-cv-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (denying a non-manufacturing entity a permanent injunction on the
basis that monetary damages alone were adequate); z4 Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying a permanent injunction on the basis of a
lack of irreparable harm where the plaintiff did not market the product).
231. DUVALL, supra note 90, § 12:6.
232. See, e.g., Hahn & Singer, supra note 16.
233. See id. at 478 (reporting that district court decisions on appeal fare better than ITC
decisions on appeal, citing published and original research indicating a 75-80 percent survival
rate of district court cases at the Federal Circuit versus a 66 percent survival rate of ITC
cases at the Federal Circuit). But see Donald Dunner, D.J. Jakes, & J. Karceski, A Statistical
Look at the Federal Circuit’s Patent Decisions: 1982-1994, 5 FED. CIR. B. J. 151, 158-63 (1995)
(reporting, based on ITC and district court data from 1982 to 1994, a higher affirm rate for
become aware that the ITC may present the best chance for
obtaining an injunction, the ITC could potentially become a haven
for such patent holders, undermining the policy objectives served by
the decision. 
The difference in injunctive relief standards could be bridged in
several ways. First, the ITC’s domestic industry requirement could
be restricted to exclude pure licensing activities. This approach
would be consistent with the statute’s original purpose of protecting
domestic industries, and would also have the effect of filtering out
cases likely to fail one of the prongs of the permanent injunction
standard in eBay (for instance, under the irreparable injury or
inadequacy of money damages prongs).230 A second approach would
be for the President to take a more activist role in reviewing
injunctions and to take into account the eBay factors in deciding
whether or not to deny an injunction on public interest grounds. The
public interest concerns enumerated in eBay could also be reflected
by the ITC investigative attorneys’ duty to represent the public
interest in each investigation. Although the attorney initially
provides a neutral presence in the investigation, once he “declares
a position on the issues ... [it] may be quite persuasive to the
[administrative law judge in the ITC].”231
This Article declines to recommend that ITC decisions should be
given actual or de facto preclusionary effect in district courts, given
the questions surrounding bias that others have raised232 and the
substantial differences in procedures used by the two venues. In
addition, the accuracy of ITC decisions, though not directly explored
by this Article, may be worthy of further study.233 If such concerns
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234. See supra Part I.
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could be resolved, however, the application of res judicata to the
ITC’s factual findings, and perhaps to its legal findings as well,
would benefit parties and the public at large in that party exposure
to inconsistent decisions and duplicative litigation would be reduced
and patents invalidated at the ITC could not be reasserted. 
Harmonizing the venues in these ways presents a potentially
more palatable set of policy suggestions. Changing the remedies
offered by district courts and the ITC would probably require
congressional action. In light of the ITC’s present popularity, the
expansion of such remedies would probably be viewed more
favorably than proposals to limit the venue. Furthermore, harmo-
nizing the legal standards may be possible without congressional
action, through the exercise of ITC discretion. Either approach
would reduce the problems associated with overlapping jurisdiction,
without limiting party choice as to which venue or venues to file
claims. 
CONCLUSION
Based on the empirical analysis reported in this Article, several
observations about the ITC can be made. First, the venue has
outgrown its historical mandate. The legislative intent behind
section 337 was to offer a distinct solution to the discrete problem
of foreign piracy.234 The record shows, however, that the venue is
being used far more broadly. Section 337 has been widely asserted
against domestic as well as foreign actors, and has often been used
to target public companies. In addition, the ITC was designed to
provide unique relief to situations that could not be reached by
district courts.235 However, in most cases, the ITC acts not as an
alternative, but as a supplement to district court. More often than
not, disputes between the same parties over the same patents are
being initiated in both venues.236
The data also confirm the venue’s increasing popularity and
document its virtues. ITC procedures remove much of the uncer-
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Remarks at Stanford Law School Conference: Protecting IP in China (Aug. 15, 2007),
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/calendar/details/842/#related_information_and_
recordings; see also Comments of Ian Harvey, Chairman of the Intellectual Property Institute,
available at http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2007/03/burden-of-proof-and-van-doren-help.html
(last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
240. Ladas & Perry, Patent Litigation in Taiwan, available at http://www.ladas.com/
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241. For example, at Manheim District Court. See INTERNATIONAL PATENT LITIGATION, A
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS DE:38 (Michael Meller ed. 2004) (1983). 
242. Intellectual Property High Court of Japan, Number of Intellectual Property Cases
Commenced and Disposed, and Average Time Intervals From Commencement to Disposition
(Courts of First Instance: All District Courts), available at http://www.ip.courts.go.jp/
eng/documents/stat_01.html (last visited on Sept. 24, 2008) (reporting that in 2006, on
average, IP disputes took 8.5 months to resolve). Further, technical advisors from the
tainty associated with conventional patent litigation. Although
money damages are not available, injunctions are essentially
guaranteed to complainants who prevail at the ITC.237 In addition,
the strict time frames imposed by the ITC benefit both complainants
and respondents. As Kesan and Ball note regarding the long periods
of inactivity that often characterize conventional patent litigation,
“[t]hese periods are a problem for the parties: no firm or manager
likes to have unresolved legal issues, and there may be financial
implications such as market valuation.”238 Against this backdrop,
ITC litigants are much more inclined than district court litigants to
adjudicate their disputes to completion.
Another virtue of the ITC is that it increases the diversity of U.S.
patent enforcement. Venues outside of the United States, which
often do not permit American-style discovery, resolve patent
disputes more quickly and cheaply than do U.S. district courts.
Patent litigation in China, for instance, takes place in a specialized
court and is estimated to take only twelve to eighteen months and
cost only $50,000-120,000.239 Taiwan, which, after China, generates
the most section 337 cases, is reported to resolve patent cases on an
even shorter time frame of four months.240 Germany has several
“chambers” of exclusive patent jurisdiction in which cases can be
decided as quickly as six to seven months.241 Similarly, IP cases in
Japan are decided, on average, within thirteen months of filing.242
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247. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Dr. Wolfe, No. 08-0754, 2008 WL 1999758, *3-4 (E.D. Pa. May 8,
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The ITC offers a comparable venue within such a global market-
place of patent enforcement, in contrast to the relatively slower,
more expensive, and less specialized option of U.S. district court. 
Importantly, the data fail to substantiate charges of bias, whether
against foreign defendants or defendants in general. Foreign and
domestic defendants are equally likely to be named in section 337
investigations.243 In addition, although defendants in the ITC are
much more likely to lose than defendants in district courts, the
difference is not statistically significant among cases filed in both
venues.244
This Article also documents the high rate of parallel litigation
between the ITC and district courts,245 and some of the differences
between the ITC and district courts. It outlines some potential
changes to reduce the risk of duplication and inconsistency between
the two venues.246 None of these proposals would result in the
elimination of the ITC. Notwithstanding the issues associated with
having two distinct venues for patent enforcement, the data show
that the ITC has provided a valuable option for patent litigants.
They also underscore some of the broader themes of international
intellectual property. The frequency of patent litigation in multiple
venues, outside of the United States as well as within it, is likely to
continue to grow.247 That a product may be made in one country,
assembled in another, and then imported and sold into yet another
creates several potential venues for patent enforcement, depending
on where a patentee has rights. Furthermore, single products often
contain multiple components made in different locations, which in
turn may be covered by multiple patents, further increasing the
exposure to enforcement actions in multiple venues. Finally,
studying the ITC reminds us that the distinctions between us and
them, foreigners and domestics, are often complex. As the United
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States formulates its international intellectual property policy,
these complexities should be taken into account.
